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TRANSFORMING CHINA'S TRADITIONAL BANKING SYSTEMS
UNDER THE NEW NATIONAL BANKING LAWS
Andrew Xuefeng Qian*
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional Chinese, "bank" translates to "qian zhuang", which means
a place where money is deposited and lent and a profit is made. However,
for three decades under the centrally planned economy in China (1949-1979),
the Chinese government owned and controlled banks. Rather than "qian
zhuang", a profit-generating body, banks in China had been operated more
like a government administrative agency to perform the government's
economic and monetary polices. As a result, banks in general were operated
in the red with heavy government subsidies.
The economic reforms initiated in late 1978 entailed a significant
restructuring of China's unitary and inefficient banking and financial
systems. In recent years, banking reform has appeared increasingly
important at a time when the central government is combatting double-digit
inflation, seeking to attract more foreign trade and investment, and
attempting to rescue thousands of ailing state-run enterprises that are mired
in operational losses and "triangular debts".1
The recently enacted Central Banking Law and the Commercial Banking
Law seek to solidify the progress that has been made, and more significantly,
provide a framework in which a new banking system will develop. Such a
new banking system will make China more closely integrated with
international banking and financial systems. As a crucial part of the overall
economic reforms, this could help to overhaul China's entire financial
* Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; J.D., Yale (1994), M.A., UCLA (1991),
LL.B., Foreign Affairs College (Beijing, 1985). The author wishes to thank friends at the
People's Bank of China, the editors of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law, and finally, Gudrun Fosse.
'See Tony Walker, China to Impose Tougher Discipline on Banks, FIN. TIMEs, June 29,
1995, at 6 (noting that among most serious burdens on banking system is that of "triangular
debt", which means inability of one enterprise to meet its obligations to another, thus setting
off chain reaction that requires infusion of public funds to unblock the system).
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system.2 The banking system could also open up more opportunities for
foreign financial institutions that have been trying with fits and starts to
access China's banking and financial business, one of the fastest growing yet
still rather unstable areas of Chinese business.
This article consists of five parts. After a brief introduction in Part I, Part
II reviews China's early banking system in which banks operated strictly
under the model of a centrally planned economy. This part also traces the
significant changes that occurred in the banking industry since 1979,
especially in the early 1990s as broader banking reform was precipitated by
an overall economic reform that gained momentum after Deng Xiaoping's
southern China tour in January 1992. Part III examines the basic structure
and content of the two newly promulgated national banking laws and the
Central Bank's Lending Provisions made pursuant to the banking laws. Part
IV highlights the progress as well as limits and pressures facing China's
transforming banking industry. The article concludes in Part V that China's
banking reform will remain gradual and evolutionary.
I. CHINA'S BANKING SYSTEM IN TRANSFORMATION
For a long time, the People's Bank of China ("PBOC") was the only bank
in China, performing mixed functions of a sort of central bank and
commercial/merchant bank. Founded in December 1948 on the eve of the
founding of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), the PBOC had been
a government agency under the State Council with the main responsibilities
of stabilizing the value of Renminbi (the official currency) and attracting and
allocating funds for "socialist construction." It has traditionally maintained
a product-economy management system under highly centralized control,
characterized by management in kind and mandatory planning.4 As a result,
2 For a discussion of reforming China's securities industry, see Andrew X. Qian, Riding
Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in
China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62 (1993); Andrew X. Qian, Why Does Not the Rising
Water Lift the Boat? Internationalization of the Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory
Regime in China, 29 INT'L LAw. 615 (1995) [hereinafter The Rising Water].
3 See, e.g., Credit Cards Catch On in China, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1995, at 10. Credit
cards issued in China doubled in 1994 to 8.4 million from a year earier. Credit charges
totalled $6.2 billion, with 135,900 business in more than 30 cities possessing the cards.
Credits cards, however, debuted in the China market only 10 years ago. Id.
4 Liu Hongru, Developments In the Reform of China's Banking and Financial Systems
[hereinafter Reform of China's Banking and Financial Systems], 2 J. CHINESE L. 323 (1988).
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China's banks traditionally played the passive roles of bookkeepers and
cashiers.'
In late 1978, China's economic reform and open-door policies were
initiated at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist
Party Congress. In retrospect, one may briefly divide the past 16-year
history of China's banking reform into three stages of development.
The first stage, which dated from 1979 to the mid-1980s, could be
characterized as, in a common Chinese saying, "some thunders, but no
rains." The drafting of China's banking laws began in 1979 after Deng
Xiaoping-China's chief architect of reform and open door pol-
icy-remarked in October 1978 that China's banks should be operated like
real banks.7 However, as the overall economic reform had just taken off,
the traditional system of a planned economy was not completely dismantled
and people had little idea of what a new banking system would look like.
Not surprisingly, some people looked to the west for models. In addition,
after the initial years of reform in the rural areas, economic reform programs
had expanded into the urban areas in the mid-1980s. The banking reform
was placed on the agenda as a part of the urban reform. Around 1983, after
the newly created Industrial and Commercial Bank of China took over the
commercial-banking functions of PBOC, a group of young PBOC staff
members proposed to make PBOC officially a central bank, and moreover,
a statutory body answerable only to the National People's Congress
("NPC") 8-a model similar to the United States' Federal Reserve System.
Such a proposal was eventually rejected, because the authorities believed that
the stakes were too high for the government to relinquish its control and to
have an independent banking system like the United States' Federal Reserve
System.9
5 Id.
6 For an overview of China's economic reform and open-door policy, see generally
HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REvOLUTION: REFORM AFrER MAO (1987). See also
RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO (1995).
7 Han Yuting et al., Ba Yinghang Banchen Zhenzhen de Yinghang - Zhongguo Renmin
Yinghang Fa Chutaiji [We Should Operate Banks Like Real Banks - History of the People's
Bank of China Law], RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), Apr. 21, 1995, at 2.
8 See Joan Zheng, Battling China's Inflation, FAR EASTERN ECo. REv., Mar. 30, 1995,
at 34.
9 The U.S. Federal Reserve System was created under the Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat.
251 (1913). The Act created a seven-member board of governors to supervise the Federal
Reserve System. There are 12 reserve districts in the United States, and the Act created a
1996]
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In January 1986, the Chinese government issued Provisional Regulations
Concerning the Administration of Banks that symbolized the first step
towards banking reform. The commercial-lending business was separated
from the PBOC and transferred to newly created "specialized banks."1
Thus, in the mid-1980s, four "specialized banks" were established, including
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ("ICBC")," the Agricultural
Bank of China ("ABC"),12 the Bank of China ("BOC")" and the People's
Construction Bank of China ("PCBC")."4 Several other commercial banks
were also set up around this period including the Bank of Communications,
Citic Industrial Bank and Everbright Bank. The PBOC had gradually taken
reserve bank in each district with the power to issue Federal Reserve System notes and to
rediscount commercial paper and agricultural obligations. Membership in the Federal Reserve
System was made mandatory for national banks and available upon application for qualifying
state banks. See STEPHEN K. HUBER, BANK OFFIcER's HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 1-6, 1-7 (2d ed. 1989). See generally MILTON R. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S
HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING LAw 1989 (providing overview of Federal Reserve
System in Part 1(3)); cf. Louis Uchitelle, At the End, It Looks Like Deja Vu, Again, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 1995 at El, E5 (criticizing Federal Reserve System for being overly cautious,
slowing down economy when it is booming, and being reluctant to bring back prosperity).
10 For a discussion of "specialized banks", see Liu Hongru, Reform of China's Banking
and Financial Systems, supra note 4, at 350-52 (noting specialized banks are not responsible
for their own profits and losses, their operating results are not linked to their own profits, and
loans are made regardless of risk).
" With 500,000 employees and 50,000 branches, ICBC is the largest among the four
specialized banks. Many of its clients are among China's top 500 state-owned enterprises,
which could hardly be a bonus. See, e.g., Tony Walker, Slow Winds of Change Blow Among
China's Banks - Banks Are Trying to Free Themselves From State Control But Barriers
Remain And Progress Has Been Varied, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at 32, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Slow Winds].
12 Ile ABC is in better shape than the ICBC partly because of the success of its township
and village enterprises. The ABC has also divested responsibilities for policy lending in
agriculture to the newly established Agricultural Development Bank and has transferred one-
fifth of its assets to the new policy bank. The ABC has reportedly taken a tougher approach
by refusing new lending to the more recalcitrant creditors among state enterprises. Id.
13 Long considered a specialized bank in overseas and foreign exchange business, BOC
has 170,000 employees and 8,000 branches in China and 474 overseas offices. Id.
"4 With 250,000 employees and 25,000 branches, PCBC is regarded as being in the best
position among the three domestic specialized banks to commercialize. Some of its
responsibilities have been taken over by the newly established State Development Bank to
handle infrastructure lending for big projects such as the Three Gorges Dam. PCBC has
formed a joint venture with Morgan Stanley, China International Capital Corp. Ltd., to raise
capital abroad to fund China's infrastructure project. Id.
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on some responsibilities exclusively as a central bank. The following
descriptions best summarized China's banking system in the mid-1980s:
"The organizational principle of the current financial system
in China is unified leadership and division of specialism.
The overall financial system implements the unified policy,
plan and system which are stipulated by the State. Each
specialized bank has its special responsibility in its own
field. Thus a socialist multi-level financial system with
Chinese characteristics has been established, with the central
bank as its core and specialized state banks as its main
body, and with co-existing diversified forms of financial
organization. 5
The third stage, from the early 1990s until the present, witnessed some
significant changes to China's banking system. In 1992, under the general
theme of establishing a "socialist market economy with Chinese characteris-
tics," the government issued the Decision on Financial System Reform
("Guanyu Jinrong Tizhi Gaige de Jueding"), calling for the establishment of
a central bank which would be solely responsible for implementing a sound
monetary policy, controlling currency and credit supply, and exercising strict
supervision over financial institutions. Under the government's new
initiatives, a working group for drafting national banking laws was formed
in February 1993. Quickly, drafts of the national banking laws were
sanctioned in principle at a Communist Party Plenary Session in late
1993.16
In 1994-95, China's banking reform took three steps toward building an
efficient and autonomous banking system. First, China started reforming its
foreign exchange control system. It got rid of the dual exchange rate system
for Renminbi yuan that had been in practice for many years. Also, it aims
to make Renminbi a fully convertible free currency in the next three to five
years. As an initial step, China would permit limited foreign exchange
trading in four locations, including Shanghai, Dalian, Shenzhen and eastern
" CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, INFORMATION CHINA 633 (1988).
16 See Jeffrey Parker, China Unveils Sweeping Reforms to Banking System, REUTERS,
Dec. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file.
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Jiangsu Province.1 7 Second, three policy banks ("zhengce yinhang") were
formed, including the State Import and Export Bank, the State Development
Bank, and the State Agricultural Bank. This to a large extent freed the four
specialized banks from making the so-called "policy loans" that are often
non-performing and thus are not normally made under a commercial bank's
standards. The "big four", after two years of rapid growth, were positioning
themselves to become commercial banks. Meanwhile, in order to control
inflation and to sustain a reasonable economic growth rate, PBOC, then
headed by executive Vice Premier Zhu Rongji,18 was shifting from using
methods of direct control (such as credit freeze and administrative measures)
to applying mechanisms of indirect control (e.g. interest rates, reserve funds
deposit rates, and open markets)., 9 Third, China's banking industry is
gradually opening up to foreign participation. China has opened over 20
cities to foreign financial institutions,20 and has permitted foreign banks to
participate in some local banking or non-banking financial business.
As of mid-1995, there are three state policy banks, four state specialized
banks, ten commercial banks, over five thousand urban credit co-ops, and
some sixty thousand rural credit co-ops.2 The gradual yet significant
banking reform needs national laws to solidify the progress and provide
guidance for further (and perhaps bolder) experimentation.
III. A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY
Since 1979, although China has promulgated certain regulations for the
banking industry at either administrative or local levels governing banks and
17 See Tony Walker, China to Permit Limited Forex Trading, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996,
at 4.
'
8 See Joyce Barnathan and Dexter Roberts, In China's Shadow Play, The Man To Watch
May Be Zhu, Bus. WEEK, July 17, 1995, at 53 (discussing Zhu's role in running China's
economy, including his achievements at Central Bank as he recently stepped down as
Governor). See also WORLD WIRE: Postscripts, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at A14
(discussing appointment of Dai Xianglong to succeed Zhu Rongji as Central Bank's new
Governor).
19 See Ding Jianmin, Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Zaici Tigao Daikuan Lilu [PBOC Again
Raised Lending Rates], RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), July 1, 1995, at 4 (noting that PBOC
will raise lending rates 0.24% to financial institutions and raise annual lending rates to
commercial banks and other financial institutions 0.96%).
'o See Walker & Peel, infra note 64.
21 See Kathy Chen, China to Create Commercial Banks In 35 Big Cities, WALL ST. J.,
June 21, 1995, at A15.
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credit unions,22 international banking,2" foreign exchanges' and insur-
ance,2 the overall legal regime governing the banking industry is far from
adequate. The PRC People's Bank of China Law26 (hereinafter the "Central
Banking Law") and the Commercial Banking Law27 are the first national
laws enacted to govern the banking system.
A. The Central Banking Law
The Central Banking Law has eight chapters. It establishes the People's
Bank of China as China's central bank," sets up a basic structure under
' See, e.g., Provisional Regulations Concerning the Administration of Banks (1986)
[Yinhang Guanli Zhanxin Tiaoli], Rules Concerning the Banks Methods of Settlement (1988)
[Yinhang Jiesuan Banfa], Provisional Regulations Concerning the Municipal Co-operative
Credit Unions [Chengsi Xinyong Hezuoshe Zanxin Tiaoli] and Provisional Regulations
Concerning Administration of Cash (1988) [Xianjin Guanli Zhanxin Tiaoli]. The above texts
are available in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINEss: BusINEss REGULATION, Vol. 1 (CCH
Int'l, 1993) [hereinafter CHINA LAWS].
73 Rules Concerning the Administration of Foreign Invested and China-Foreign Invested
Financial Institutions in the Special Economic Zones (1985) [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Jinji Tequ Waizi Yinhang Zhongwai Hezi Yinhang Guanli Tiaoli] and Methods Concerning
Administration of Overseas Financial Institutions (1990) [Jinwai Jinrong Jigou Guanli Banfa].
CHINA LAWS, supra note 22.
24 Provisional Regulations Concerning Administration of Foreign Exchanges (1980)
[Waihui Guanli Zzanxin tiaoli]; Detailed Rules on Penalizing Violations of Foreign Exchange
Regulations (1985) [Weifan Waihui Guanli Chufa Shixin Xize] and Methods Concerning
Administration of Overseas Investment (1989) [Jinwai Touzi Waihui Guanli Banfa]. CHINA
LAWS, supra note 22.
7 Provisional Regulations Concerning Administration of Insurance Enterprises (1985)
[Baoxian Qiye Guanli Zhanxin Tiaoflj. CHINA LAWS, supra note 22. The national Insurance
Law was approved on the 14th session of the 8th NPC Standing Committee. See He Ping,
Bajie Renda Changweihui Shisici Huiyi Bimu [14th Session of the 8th NPC Standing
Committee Has Ended], RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), July 1, 1995, at 1. The recent NPC
Standing Committee session approved Insurance Law, Financial Guaranty Law and Decision
to Punish Crimes of Sabotaging Financial Order. Id.
2 Approved on the 3d Session of the 8th National People's Congress ("NPC") on March
18, 1995, the Central Banking Law becomes effective on the day of promulgation. For the
text, see RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), Mar. 23, 1995, at 2. For the English translation, see
CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, June 27, 1995, at 23-30.
2 Approved on the 13th Session of the 8th Standing Committee of the 8th NPC on May
10, 1995, it will become effective on July 1, 1995. For the text, see RENMIN RIBAO (overseas
ed.), May 13, 1995 at 2. For the English translation, see CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, June 27,
1995, at 32-48.
2 Central Banking Law, art. 2 (China).
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which the central bank will operate, and prescribes two major functions for
the central bank.
1. Nature and Structure
Owned by the state, the People's Bank of China ("PBOC") was estab-
lished to formulate and implement the government's monetary policies as
well as exercise supervision and administration of the financial industry
under the leadership of the State Council.29 It is not clear whether PBOC
as the central bank falls into the same rank as other government ministries
such as the Ministry of Finance, or occupies a special position in the State
Council (cabinet). As a new method of exercising some kind of supervision
by the national legislature, the central bank must report its work to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ("NC").30
One of the most unique features about the Central Banking Law is that it
forbids any government authorities at any level, any local governments,
social organizations or individuals to interfere in the PBOC's lawful and
independent implementation of monetary policy, fulfilling its responsibilities,
and business operation. 3' Nevertheless, because many of the PBOC
provincial branches are under the dual administration of both the PBOC
headquarter in Beijing and the local provincial or municipal government, one
may hope that in practice as is written in law, such interference will be
substantially reduced (if not eliminated).
2. Major Responsibilities
The central bank is charged with three major responsibilities: making and
implementing national monetary policy, 32 exercising supervision and
administration over financial institutions,33 and maintaining the stability of
the official currency-Renminbi yuan. In performing its responsibility as
29 Id. arts. 2 & 7.
3' Id. art. 6. In addition to NPC's supervisory role, one can argue that NPC also has the
right, through some of its special committees (e.g., the Legislative Committee, the Committee
of Economy and Finance), to exercise supervision in making sure that the national laws are
properly implemented.
3' Id. art. 7.
32 Id. Part One (General Provisions), Part Three (Renminbi) and Part Four (Business
Operations).
33 Id. Chapter Five (discussing Financial Supervision and Administration).
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monetary policy maker and executor, the Central Banking Law provides the
PBOC with economic and market-oriented mechanisms or tools rather than
purely administrative measures, including requiring banks to deposit
reserves,' determining the basic interest rate,35 operating rediscounts for
financial institutions that have accounts with the PBOC, 36 granting loans to
commercial banks, 37 and buying and selling treasury bonds and other
government securities and foreign exchanges in the open market.38
Meanwhile, the Central Banking Law also prohibits the PBOC from
engaging in certain activities, such as directly subscribing for or underwriting
treasury bonds or other government securities, 39 or providing loan to local
government, governmental authorities at any level, non-banking financial
institutions, other work units, or individuals.' In addition, the central bank
may not provide guarantees to any work units or individuals."'
The second major responsibility for the PBOC is to supervise and regulate
financial institutions.42 However, there is some ambiguity in some of the
provisions (or lack of provisions) in the Central Banking Law that needs
future clarification. First, due to the rather vague provisions in the new
national securities law, there could be potential (perhaps major) conflicts
between the PBOC and the State Council's Securities Commission regarding
the jurisdictions of some securities or securities-related institutions (which
are considered to be financial institutions). The jurisdiction to regulate these
institutions could arguably belong to both or either regulatory bodies. Such
jurisdictional problems could also extend to supervision and administration
over some non-financial institutions that perform certain financial func-
tions.43 Second, though not explicit in the language, foreign financial
institutions or China-foreign joint ventures in financial industry seem also to
'Id. art. 22(1).
3" Id. art. 22(2).
'Id. art. 22(4).
37 Id. art. 22(4).
Id. art. 22(5).
3 'Id. art. 28.
40 Id. art. 29.
41 Id. art. 29.
42 See Id. Part 5, arts. 30-36.
43 Cf. Fei Yinghang Jinrong Jigou Jiang Jiaqiang Jianguan [PBOC Will Enforce Its
Supervision over the Non-Bank Financial Institutions], WORLD J. (New York), May 3, 1995,
at B15 (noting PBOC plans to issue rules in next two or three years regarding insurance,
securities, lottery and investment funds).
19961
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be subject to the PBOC's supervision and administration. That means that
foreign banks need to obtain approval primarily from the PBOC for
establishing branches, representative offices or forming joint ventures in
China.
B. The Commercial Banking Law
1. General Principles
The concept of a commercial bank is rather new to China's banking
industry, because most of the current candidates yet to be fully transformed
into commercial banks in China are labelled as "specialized banks"
("zhuanye yinhang"). Today, they are the "big four," the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the People's
Construction Bank of China and the Bank of China. According to the
Commercial Banking Law, commercial banks, under the supervision of the
central bank," should be operated under the principles of efficiency, safety
and liquidity. The commercial banks should rely on self-operation ("zizhu
finyin"), self-risk management ("zidanfenxian"), self-responsibility for profits
or losses ("zifiu yinkui"), and self-restraint ("ziwuo yuesu"). 45  Their
operations should be independent and free from any interference of any work
units or individuals.46
2. Establishment
The Commercial Banking Law contains provisions that explain how
commercial banks are to be established and organized. There are different
minimum amounts of registered capital requirements for a commercial bank
(which shall be RMB 1 billion), an urban co-operative credit union (which
shall be RMB 100 million) and a rural co-operative credit union (which shall
be RMB 50 million), depending upon the needs of economic development
and details of competition within the banking industry. 47 Apart from
complying with the PRC Company Law procedures of incorporating a
44 Commercial Bank Law, art. 10.
4 Id. art. 4.46 1d.
47 Id. arts. 12, 13.
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company, a new commercial bank incorporator must file an application with
and submit certain documents to the central bank for approval."
3. Lending Business and Other Operations
Under the new Commercial Banking Law, a commercial bank must make
strict examination of the borrower regarding its borrowing purpose and its
ability and method of repayment.49 It is required that each loan by
commercial banks receive guarantees or collateral, and the lending banks
should make strict investigations of the guarantors regarding their repayment
ability, the ownership and value of their collateral and the feasibility of
realizing the mortgage or pledge rights, 0 except that those borrowers with
excellent credit could be waived from making such a guarantee."
Once the borrower fails to repay a guaranteed or secured loan upon
maturity, the lending bank shall have the lawful right to require the guarantor
to repay the principal and interest of such loan, or alternatively have the
preemptive right to receive compensation via the collateral.52 A work unit
or individual may not force the bank to make a commercial lending or
provide a guarantee. 53 Only a state-owned commercial bank may lend to
special projects approved by the State Council and any losses resulting from
such lending will get remedies from the State Council.' The new law also
specifically emphasizes the management of debt-equity ratio.55
Furthermore, a commercial bank is forbidden from participating in a
number of activities or businesses stipulated in the Commercial Banking
Law. For example, commercial banks may not engage in trust investment
4
8 Id. art. 14.
49 Id. art. 35.
"0 Id. art. 36. It is less clear whether providing guarantee is equivalent to a secured
transaction, where the borrower itself and its subsidiaries or affiliates give secured interest in
their assets to the lender as is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (Article 9) in the
United States.
51 Id.
52 Id. art. 42.
" Id. art. 41. See also Chinese Banks May Say No, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at A17
(noting that Bank of Communications, Bank of China, People's Construction Bank of China
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China account for 80% of financial transactions and
credit in China, and 15% of their loans are bad).
Commercial Banking Law art. 41.
s Id. art. 39.
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or stock business and may not invest in real properties (which are not for its
own use) within the PRC.5 6 In addition, commercial banks may not
normally invest in a non-banking financial institution or enterprise within the
PRC.
57
The new Commercial Banking Law has a separate chapter that addresses
the issues of protecting the interests of depositors. The new law affords a
commercial bank rights to reject any inquiry, freezing, deduction or
garnishing from any work units or individuals on deposits made either by
work units or individuals (unless the law provides otherwise).58 Individual
depositors, according to the new law, shall enjoy "voluntariness of deposit-
ing, freedom of withdrawal, payment of interest on deposits and maintaining
confidentiality". It remains to be seen in practice that depositors' interests
would be truly protected by commercial banks under this provision.59
4. Foreign Banks
The new Commercial Banking Law will also apply to foreign-owned
commercial banks, China-foreign joint invested commercial banks and
foreign banks' branches. Thus, as the Central Banking Law is rather vague
on whether foreign banks or branches and banks of a joint venture type are
to be supervised and regulated by the PBOC, the Commercial Banking Law
has made clear provisions in this respect.
C. Lending General Provisions (Trial Implementation)60
Pursuant to the Central Banking Law and the Commercial Banking Law,
PBOC sets forth a set of more detailed principles and standards that shall be
' Id. art. 43. This provision is similar to the Glass-Steagall Act, which forbids American
commercial banks from engaging in the securities underwriting business. See STEPHEN K.
HUBER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION § 12.03 1989; cf The
Future of Banking: A Discussion, TE NATIONAL L.J., July 17, 1995, at A1, A24 (discussing
various proposals to reform Glass-Steagall Act).
Commercial Banking Law art. 43.
Commercial Banking Law arts. 29, 30.
See Liu Siyang, Renda Changweihui Huiyi Fenzu Shenyi Sige Falu he Yige Jueding
Chaoan [NPC Standing Committee Holds Sessions to Discuss Four Laws and One Decisions],
RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), May 9, 1995, at 1 (noting that when discussing Commercial
Banking Law, some NPC members suggested more concrete measures be made to protect
depositors' interest).
60 Promulgated by the PBOC on, and effective as of July 27, 1995; both the text and the
English translation are available in CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Nov. 1, 1995, at 35-53.
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observed in the domestic lending and borrowing activities. In twelve Parts
and eighty-two Articles, the Lending General Provisions (the "Provisions")
govern types of loans, loan periods and interest rates, borrowers' rights and
obligations, lenders' rights and obligations, lending procedures, administra-
tion of loans and protection of loans. Although the trial Provisions contain
certain overly rigid6 or still ambiguous rules, the Provisions represent the
Central Bank's comprehensive efforts to restructure and reform the banking
business in a systematic, not piecemeal, fashion. The Provisions, however,
do not apply to foreign banks or foreign financial institutions and their
operations in China.
IV. LIMITS AND PRESSURES IN CHINA'S BANKING REFORM
Shortly after the promulgation of the two national banking laws, new
commercial banks have been or are being formed in accordance with the new
banking laws.62  Furthermore, many of the urban and rural co-operative
credit unions face opportunities of restructuring and development.63
Foreign banks may gain a little sense of certainty as the legal framework
governing China's banking industry starts to take shape. Their business
activities, as well as competition, are expected to increase." China is
61 For example, under article 16(1), interest rates on loans must be within the limits set
by the PBOC. Under article 25(4), no foreign currency loans may be borrowed by individuals
except with PBOC's approval. Nor can the individual borrow the Renminbi funds and
convert them into foreign currency funds under article 21(6). Furthermore, article 25(2)
prohibits lenders from making a loan for the purpose of earning interest. Disobedience is
punishable by confiscation of the interest income and a fine of up to three times its amount.
Article 66(2).
62 See Tony Walker, First Chinese Commercial Bank, FIN. TIES, June 27, 1995, at 6
(noting Shenzhen co-operatives commercial bank would be first commercial bank to be set
up under new Commercial Bank Law); Dan Lan, Min Seng Yinghang Niannui Kaiye [The
Livelihood Bank Open End of the Year], RENMiN RtBAO, May 24, 1995, at 1. The Livelihood
Bank will be one of China's first commercial banks formed under the new Commercial Bank
Law. It will be in the shareholding form with the National Association of Industry and
Commerce as the major shareholder. Id.
63 See Chen, supra note 21, at A15.
"See Tony Walker and Quentin Peel, Way Clear for Five Banks to Open in Beijing, FIN.
TIMES, June 7, 1995, at 4. The five banks that have been approved to have branches in
Beijing include the Bank of Tokyo, Citibank, Banque Indosuez, Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corp. and possibly, the Bank of East Asia. So far, China has opened 23 cities to
foreign banks' branches. At the end of 1994, 118 foreign financial institutions had established
branches China. Id. See also Waizi Yinhang Jiang Zai Hu Jinyin Renminbi Yewu [Foreign
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currently campaigning hard to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).
It has announced its initial plan to make Renminbi yuan a fully convertible
free currency in the next three to five years.65 Coupled with the efforts
toward trade liberalisation and full currency convertibility, China is also
beginning to reform thousands of large and medium-sized state-run
enterprises. These events and their significant progress-China's prospective
entry into the WTO, Renminbi becoming a free currency and the state-run
enterprise reform-will hold opportunities as well as challenges for China's
banking industry. In light of the progress that has been made in China's
banking reform, one should be warned of being overly optimistic in China's
banking reform because the verdict for an ultimate success is still out.
First, under the current circumstances, most of the banking institutions,
especially those specialized banks and co-operative credit unions, are not up
to the standards required by the Commercial Banking Law. As one of the
banking law drafters observed, it would take "a period of time for the
banking institutions to meet all the new banking laws' requirements."'
The undisciplined banking operations are the major source of the
"financial disorder" in China. A number of financial scandals (some
unreported) have occurred, including the recent bonds trading fiasco in
Shanghai.67 In October of 1995, due to its illegal business, inferior asset
quality and undisciplined management, the Shanghai Branch of Zhongyin
Trust and Investment Corporation (a non-banking financial institution) was
placed under the direct monitoring and supervision of the PBOC Shanghai
Branch, in accordance with the national banking law provisions-the first
time that a central bank has seized a financial institution in China under the
banking laws." Charged with the major responsibility of cleaning up the
"banking and financial disorder" at a time of rapid growth of the banking
and financial industry, China's Central Bank has a tough task to accomplish
ahead.
Banks Will Participate in Renminbi Business in Shanghai], RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), Jan.
16, 1995, at 2.
6 See Beijing's Blueprint for Reform, FIN. TIMES. Nov. 13, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter
Beijing Blueprint]. During the Financial Times interview, Zhu Rongji is reported to have said
that China plans to make its currency convertible on the current account "well ahead of
schedule." Id. See also China's Currency 'Convertible Soon', FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995,
at 7. Dai Xianglong, Governor of the PBOC, said that China's currency Renminbi yuan
should be fully convertible in 1997 or 1998. Id.
6See China Passes New Banking Law, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at 3.
6 For discussion, see The Rising Water, supra note 2, at 628-29.
"See Chinese Financial Firm in Peril, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at All.
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Second, even if the banking institutions in China are operating under the
new banking laws, thus gaining much autonomy in their own operations and
management, they are far from being independent and immune from
government interference. In fact, the Central Bank is placed directly under
the State Council's leadership. The PBOC may decide what means it may
use to implement the government's monetary policy, but the decision-making
process is still under the tight control of the central government, 69 quite
contrary to the Federal Reserve System in the United States which China's
new banking system has somehow drawn upon. For commercial banks,
likewise, government influence would be strong.
Furthermore, structurally, the PBOC and the big four have thousands of
regional and local branch offices that are under dual administration by the
headquarters and the regional or local governments. Such an administrative
structure could hardly guarantee the full autonomy granted to the banking
institutions in the new banking laws.
Third, the success of China's banking reform goes hand-in-hand with that
of state enterprise reform. Currently, the number of China's large and
medium-sized state enterprises totals fourteen thousand. And nearly one-half
of these fourteen hundred state enterprises were debt-ridden in the first half
of 1995."' Most of these chronically in the red enterprises have had loans
from the formerly state banks or from other enterprises which were
borrowers from those banks (creating the so-called "triangular debt"). By
strict commercial standards, some of China's commercial banks are facing
banking insolvency because the bad loans they are unable to recover from
thousands of failing state enterprises could amount to one-third of their total
commercial loans.71 For the "big four" commercial banks, the PBOC's new
governor estimated that problem loans stand at twenty percent of their total
69 Cf. Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fu Hangzhang Zhou Zhenqin Jiu Zhongguo Renmin
Yinhangfa Da Jizhe Wen [Vice-Governor of PBOC Answered the Press], RENMIN RIBAO, Mar.
22, 1995, at 4 (arguing independence for Central Bank means independence from other
government agencies and local governments, but the monetary policy is a part of country's
macro-economic policy). See Henry Sender, Black-Box Bankers, FAR EAsTERN Eco. REv.,
Feb. 9, 1995, at 48-49 (noting strange phenomenon in China that central bankers are little
known and aspire to obscurity rather than prominence).
'm See Tony Walker, China to Reform State Companies, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, at 7
[hereinafter Reform of State Enterprises].
7' According to one estimate, some 45% of China's 11,000 medium to large state
companies were in the red in 1994. See Slow Winds, supra note 11, at 32.
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advances, and less than two percent of them are irrecoverable.72 Unless the
enterprise reform takes a dramatic course and these state enterprises are
quickly transformed either into profit-making corporations through merger,
acquisition, divesture, or management buy-out, or are allowed to go
bankrupt, China's banks may have to continue "throwing meat to dogs which
can't be retrieved."73
To date, Beijing would target one thousand large state enterprises which
are key and vital to the national economy for special assistance, which
includes continuing bank loans at favorable terms. Enterprise debt would be
allowed to be converted to equity as part of the efforts to "corporatize" the
state sector and encourage merger.74 Meanwhile, a large number of state
enterprises that are not considered vital to the national economy will become
likely candidates for either divesture, management buy-out, merger, or
bankruptcy.75 From the government's current modest plan,76 the enterprise
reform may take longer than expected to come into full swing. One of
China's top officials estimated that "if the state banks are to be genuine
commercial banks, we have to await the completion of the reform of the
state-owned enterprises, and we will try to attain that goal by the end of the
Century. '77 Meanwhile, the reform package keeps being revised and has
yet to be finalized.
Last but not least, banks in China, especially the Central Bank, are facing
mounting pressure and the dilemma between implementing and maintaining
tight money policies in order to curb the rampant inflation rate on the one
72 See Peter Montagnon et al., Bad Loans at Chinese Banks Total 20%, FiN. TIME, Oct.
30, 1995, at 1.
' The metaphor was made by Wang Qiren, former chairman of the Bank of China. See
Slow Winds, supra note 11, at 32 (noting that by western measures, non-performing loans may
account for up to 30 percent of loan portfolios for those Chinese banks, and these bad loans
would render three out of four specialized banks technically insolvent). See also Peter
Montagnon, Bad Debts Curb Modernisation Drive, CHINA SURvEY, Nov. 20, 1995, at 5;
Craig Smith, Chinese Companies Writing Off Old Debts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1995, at A4.
74 See Reform of State Enterprises, supra note 70.
75 id.
76 See Beijing To Hold Assets Tight, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at 14 (proposing that
reform of China's debt-ridden enterprises won't involve privatization to any significant
degree, and these assets will remain in state hands). See also Li Andin, Guojia Jinmaowei
Gongbu Gouyou Qiye Jinnian Gaige Yaodian [State's Commission on Economy and Trade
Announced This Year's Enterprise Reform Key Points], RENMIN RIBAO (overseas ed.), Feb.
8, 1995, at 1.
77 See Beijing Blueprint, supra note 65.
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hand, and supplying sufficient funds and loosening credit in order to sustain
the economic growth at a considerable speed on the other."8 Maintaining
a balance between the above two equally legitimate, yet somewhat conten-
tious concerns would be a tough test for the central and commercial banks
in China.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of two new banking laws illustrates some progress in
reforming China's banking system. China needs to keep working to
overcome the above-discussed limits and pressure points. China's banking
reform would be gradual and at times frustrating to outsiders (as expectations
often exceed reality). Inevitably, China's banking industry faces an uphill
battle as it is seeking to gain more autonomy from the central government
on the one side and to be freed from making those "policy loans" to the
state-run enterprises on the other. Meanwhile, it is facing increasing
competition both home and abroad from the foreign counterparts. A new
banking system in China would be very different from the old Chinese "qian
zhuang" in size and sophistication, but the essence of any banking operations
and management, i.e. efficiency and independence, should remain basically
unchanged.
78 See Kathy Chen, China's Central Bank Chief Reaffirms Commitment to Keep Inflation
in Check, AWSJ, Oct. 16, 1995, at 3. See also Chinese Loans to be Increased, FIN. TIMES,
May 24, 1996, at 7 (ICBC plans to increase lending for working capital this year by some 10
percent, in line with government's decision to ease credit to struggling state enterprises).
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